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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Over the past two years, the world has witnessed the unfolding of 
the “subprime mortgage crisis”.  A steep rise in home foreclosures be-
ginning in late 2006 caused a ripple effect throughout the economy, 
resulting in a dearth of liquidity across the lending sector.  The largest 
rise in defaults occurred on so-called “subprime”1 and other adjustable 
rate mortgages (ARMs).2  These types of mortgages were offered initial-
∗ Bradley J. Bondi is counsel to a commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and serves as an adjunct professor at George Mason University 
School of Law where he teaches Advanced Securities Regulation.  The SEC, as a matter 
of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its 
employees.  The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the Commission, any commissioner, or of the author’s colleagues 
upon the staff of the Commission.  Prior to joining the SEC, the author was a partner 
with Kirkland & Ellis LLP and, prior to that, an associate with Williams & Connolly 
LLP.  The author wishes to thank Professor Steven Varholik of Georgetown University 
Law Center for his advice and support.  Any errors or omissions, however, are the 
author’s own. 
 1. A subprime mortgage is a loan having a higher interest rate and suboptimal 
terms than a traditional loan.  A subprime mortgage is obtained usually by persons who 
do not qualify for a traditional loan due to poor credit scores, a history of default, or 
other negative factors.  See Danielle DiMartino & John V. Duca, The Fed. Reserve 
Bank of Dallas, The Rise and Fall of Subprime Mortgages, ECON. LETTER, Vol. 2, No. 
11, at 2 (Nov. 2007), available at http://dallasfed.org/research/eclett/2007/el0711.pdf. 
 2. An adjustable rate mortgage is a type of mortgage where the interest rate varies 
according to a specific benchmark.  See Investopedia.com, Adjustable-Rate Mortgage 
(ARM), http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/arm.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).  The 
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ly during a time of rising housing prices, often to unqualified borrow-
ers,3 who thought that they would later have the opportunity to refinance 
at more favorable terms.  As housing prices declined, however, re-
financing became more difficult; defaults increased sharply as interest 
rates reset at higher rates on many of the mortgages.4  These events 
contributed to approximately 1.3 million foreclosures in 2007, an 
increase of approximately 75% from 2006.5  Foreclosures increased to 
2.3 million in 2008, an increase of approximately 80% from 2007.6  
Some experts have estimated that subprime defaults ultimately will 
reach between $200 billion and $300 billion before the crisis ends.7 
Mortgage lenders and banks – which maintained the mortgages on 
their balance sheets, and thereby retained the credit risk – suffered the 
first losses.  Other financial institutions avoided large losses, however, 
by passing along the credit risk to investors through securitization of the 
mortgages into mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and collateralized 
mortgage obligations (CMOs).  These investment products, in turn, were 
purchased by retail and institutional investors, often following a recom-
mendation by a broker-dealer. 
MBSs are asset-backed securities having cash flows backed by the 
mortgage industry (primarily thrift institutions) developed adjustable rate mortgages to 
control against the risk to lenders associated with interest rates.  See Thomas P. 
Vartanian, Counseling Participants in the Development of New Financial Products, 
Services, and Techniques, Practising Law Inst., PLI Order No. A4-4134 73, 169 (1985).  
ARMs gained popularity in the United States around 1980.  See id. at 170. 
 3. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street 
Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 (2007) (describing predatory 
lending practices where lenders make loans to borrowers who they know cannot afford 
the monthly payments). 
 4. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, Speech at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s 43rd Annual Conference on Bank Structure and 
Competition: The Subprime Mortgage Market (May 17, 2007) (transcript available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Bernanke20070517a.htm) 
(discussing the multiple causes of subprime adjustable-rate mortgage delinquencies); 
see also DiMartino & Duca  supra note 1, at 1, 5.  
 5. Press Release, RealtyTrac Inc., U.S. Foreclosure Activity Increases 75 Percent 
in 2007 (Jan. 29, 2008), available at http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/ 
pressrelease.aspx?ChannelID=9&ItemID=3988&accnt=64847. 
 6. Press Release, RealtyTrac Inc., U.S. Foreclosure Activity Increases 81 Percent 
in 2008 (Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/ 
pressrelease.aspx?ChannelID=9&ItemID=5681&accnt=64847. 
 7. See Postcards from the Ledge, ECONOMIST, Dec. 19, 2007, at 10. 
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principal and interest payments of a pool of mortgage loans.8  Payments 
are made periodically over the lifetime of the underlying loans.9  CMOs 
are more complex mortgage-backed securities, comprised of pools of 
home mortgages backed by government-insured agencies such as 
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.10  There are two streams of income from 
each pool:  one from the aggregate interest payments and the other from 
the aggregate principal payments made on the mortgages.11  These 
income streams are then divided into tranches based on credit quality 
and sold as separate securities to investors.12  Losses are applied in 
reverse order of seniority and, therefore, junior tranches offer higher 
coupons (interest rates) to compensate investors for the added default 
risk.13  Due to the risk associated with junior tranches, they have been 
called “toxic waste” by some commentators.14  Because CMOs are 
backed by government-sponsored agencies, each tranche usually retains 
a surprisingly high rating, although each has a completely different risk 
profile.15 
CMO derivatives, such as “inverse floaters”16 and “interest-only 
strips,”17 have become popular among investors in recent years.  These 
derivatives have considerably more risks than normal CMOs.  One of 
the risks associated with CMO derivatives is that their value fluctuates 
significantly with slight changes in interest rates.18  These products are 
 8. See SEC, Mortgage-Backed Securities, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgage 
securities.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2008). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See SEC, Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs), http://www.sec.gov/ 
answers/tcmos.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2008). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. For a detailed discussion of the conflicts between the various tranches, see 
Michael Mackenzie, ‘Super-Senior’ CDO Investors Flex Their Muscles, FINANCIAL 
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2008, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b2bcd0ee-0a5b-11dd-
b5b1-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1. 
 14. See Investopedia.com, Toxic Waste, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/ 
toxicwaste.asp (last visited Nov. 7, 2008). 
 15. See John Churchill, The Death of a Brokerage, REGISTERED REP., Aug. 1, 2007, 
available at http://www.registeredrep.com/advisorland/regulatory/finance_death_broker 
age/index.html. 
 16. See Investopedia.com, Inverse Floater, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/ 
inversefloater.asp (last visited Nov. 7, 2008). 
 17. See Investopedia.com, Interest Only (IO) Strips, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/i/iostrips.asp (last visited Nov. 7, 2008). 
 18. Churchill, supra note 15 (“One of the risks associated with CMO derivatives 
254 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &  Vol. XIV 
 FINANCIAL LAW 
 
also illiquid, meaning that investors are often stuck holding the securi-
ties even as their value spirals downward.19  A related risk of CMO de-
rivatives is pricing risk.  Often CMO derivatives are priced only once a 
month, using methodologies that may not be readily transparent.  As a 
result, when the time comes to sell the CMO derivatives, investors may 
find it difficult to arrive at a price.20 
MBSs and CMOs gained tremendous popularity with investors in 
the late 1990s and in the early part of this decade when broker-dealers 
began recommending them to retail and institutional customers as suit-
able investment alternatives to treasury securities to hedge against infla-
tion risk while earning a presumably safe return.  In Banca Cremi, S.A. 
v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., the Fourth Circuit summarized the turbulent 
CMO market of the late-1980s to the mid-1990s: “From 1987 to 1993, 
U.S. government-sponsored CMO issuances grew dramatically, from 
$900 million to $311 billion per year.  The market in CMOs collapsed in 
1994; new issuances fell to $25.4 billion in 1995.”21 
In the late 1990s, the country witnessed a resurgence in the mort-
gage-backed securities market as mortgage rates dropped and home 
sales increased.22  In 2000, the MBS market overtook the market for 
U.S. treasury securities.23  At its height, the total market value of all out-
standing U.S. MBSs was approximately $6.1 trillion.24  “[A]lmost $2 
trillion [of that amount consisted of] riskier nonagency securities that are 
not insured by the federal government or by Fannie Mae or Freddie 
Mac.”25 
When the subprime mortgage crisis hit the U.S. economy in late 
2006, many investors holding MBSs or CMOs that were purchased 
before 2006 suffered significant losses because the values of the under-
like inverse floaters and interest-only strips . . . is that their value fluctuates wildly with 
small moves in interest rates.”). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1022 (4th Cir. 
1997). 
 22. See Richard W. Stevenson, The Outlook for Recovery: Three Factors to Watch, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2001, § 3, at 4. 
 23.  See Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n (SIFMA), U.S. Treasury Securities Out-
standing, http://www.sifma.org/research/pdf/Treasury_Securities_Outstanding.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2008). 
 24. See Edmund L. Andrews, Fed Hopes To Ease Strain on Economy Activity, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2008, at A1. 
 25. Id. 
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lying assets sharply declined.  These investors included retail customers, 
corporations, and institutions such as pension funds, university endow-
ments, municipalities, and even the investment banks themselves.  The 
fact that so many investment banks purchased MBSs and CMOs is a 
significant difference from the crash in 1994.26  As one commentator 
described, “Wall Street drank its own Kool-Aid.  Big investment banks 
like Bear Stearns Cos., Citigroup and others not only sold the CDOs – 
they also bought them.”27 
The losses have been enormous.  As of May 2008, Citigroup had 
suffered a staggering $40.7 billion in subprime losses – the most of any 
bank – and had been forced to cut 9,000 jobs.28  Other subprime losses 
as of that date include:  $38 billion at UBS,29 $31.7 billion at Merrill 
Lynch,30 $14.9 billion at Bank of America, $12.6 billion at Morgan 
Stanley, $12.4 billion at HSBC, $12 billion at Royal Bank of Scotland, 
$9.7 billion at JP Morgan Chase, $8.3 billion at Washington Mutual, 
$7.5 billion at Deutsche Bank, $7.3 billion at Wachovia, and $6.3 billion 
at Credit Suisse.31 
Several financial services firms have been forced out of business 
due to their dealings in MBSs and CMOs, leaving investors with signifi-
cant losses.  Most commentators blame the demise of Bear Stearns, Wall 
Street’s fifth largest investment bank, on the subprime crisis.32  Avail-
able credit virtually dried up as banks became less willing to lend to 
 26. See Christopher Thornberg, Wall Street Bailout?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2008, 
available at http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-op-leonard-thornberg28mar28,0, 
3127741, full story. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See BBC News, Timeline: Sub-prime Losses, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ 
business/7096845.stm (last visited Nov.17, 2008).  All the figures reported in the text 
include losses from all subprime instruments, not only MBSs and CMOs.  Any 
reference to “subprime” in the Article is not limited to MBSs and CMOs. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id.  In November 2007, Merrill Lynch experienced its largest write-down in 
history of $8.4 billion, which at the time represented the biggest known loss in Wall 
Street history.  See Graham Bowley & Jenny Anderson, Where Did the Buck Stop at 
Merrill?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2007, § 3. 
 31. Timeline: Sub-prime Losses, supra note 28. 
 32. See Koelle Boyce, Bear Stearns: Latest Victim of the Sub-prime Crisis, 
BANKING BUS. REV., Mar. 17, 2008, http://www.banking-business-review.com/article_ 
feature.asp?guid=198FE768-A593-460B-AFFD-285301705565. 
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each other after they suffered large losses on subprime mortgages and 
related financial products.33 
Even smaller firms have suffered as a result of their activity in sub-
prime mortgage products.  Brookstreet Securities of Irvine, California, 
one of the top 25 independent broker-dealer firms, went out of business 
in June 2007 when a large number of institutional and retail customer 
accounts received margin calls from Brookstreet’s clearing firm, 
National Financial Services, a division of Fidelity Investments.34  The 
margin calls were sparked by a sudden decline in value of investments in 
CMOs, including CMO derivatives.35  By June 22, 2007, Brookstreet 
had exhausted its entire net capital of $12 million to meet a margin call 
and yet still had a margin balance of $70 million against securities worth 
$85 million, and that value was declining.36  Ultimately, Brookstreet 
became insolvent.37 
As losses continue to stack up for investors of MBSs and CMOs, it 
is inevitable that investors will seek legal recourse against the broker-
dealers from which they purchased the securities.  One claim that un-
doubtedly will be advanced by investors is that the MBSs and CMOs 
were “unsuitable” investments.  A broker-dealer has an obligation under 
the governing rules of self-regulatory organizations (SROs), as well as 
federal and state securities laws, to recommend only “suitable” invest-
ments and trading strategies.38  A claim for unsuitability typically arises 
when a representative of a broker-dealer recommends to a customer an 
investment that he knows, or should have known, is inappropriate for 
that customer based on the customer’s investment objectives.39  An 
allegation of unsuitability is among the most common claims brought in 
 33. See BBC News, Rescue for Troubled Wall Street Bank, Mar. 17, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7299938.stm. 
 34. Churchill, supra note 15. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See generally DAVID E. ROBBINS, SECURITIES ARBITRATION PROCEDURE 
MANUAL § 5-5 (5th ed. 2008) (describing the legal obligations of a broker-dealer under 
the various laws and rules). 
 39. See id.  In the typical unsuitability claim, the customer alleges that the broker 
recommended investments that were not appropriate for his investment goals, or even 
his age and investment objectives.  Unless otherwise indicated, this Article uses the 
terms “customer,” “investor,” and “client” interchangeably to mean generally an 
individual or institution that has a business relationship with a particular broker. 
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securities arbitration.40  In 1998, unsuitability claims accounted for 95% 
of filings under the errors and omissions insurance policies of the 
National Association of Securities Dealers (the NASD) members.41  
Unsuitability claims currently account for a large portion of the claims 
asserted by customers during FINRA arbitration proceedings.42 
Mandatory arbitration clauses in the customer agreements at virtu-
ally every broker-dealer firm mean that claims asserted by investors will 
be heard in arbitration unless both parties elect to have the case heard in 
court.43  Supreme Court precedent has made it nearly impossible for in-
vestors unilaterally to challenge a mandatory arbitration clause.44 
The shift in forum from courts to arbitration panels has had a signi-
ficant effect on jurisprudence of unsuitability claims.  In federal courts, 
unsuitability claims are brought under the antifraud provisions of the 
federal securities laws, primarily Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and 
Rule 10b-5, which together require a showing of intent to defraud or 
recklessness.45 
By contrast, unsuitability claims in arbitration are brought under the 
more amorphous rules of the self-regulatory organizations, which do not 
necessarily require proof of fraud but instead are rooted in notions of 
 40. Id.  In an Avoidance and Prevention Advisory (Advisory) distributed to its 
member firms in May 1998, the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. 
(NASD) disclosed that unsuitability claims account for ninety-five percent of filings 
under NASD members’ errors and omissions insurance policies.  See Zarb Urges 
Broker Dealers to ‘Be on Guard’ About Suitability, 30 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 810 
(May 29, 1998). 
 41. See Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Suitability in Securities 
Transactions, 54 BUS. LAW. 1557, 1557 (1999). 
 42. See Dispute Resolution Statistics, available at http://www.finra.org/Arbitration 
Mediation/AboutFINRADR/Statistics/index.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2009). This Article 
describes the existing doctrine of suitability and its application in certain circumstances, 
rather than analyzing the justification of the doctrine of suitability.  In other words, this 
Article does not undertake a normative analysis of suitability. 
 43. See generally SIFMA, White Paper on Arbitration in the Securities Industry 3 
(Oct. 2007), available at http://www.sifma.org/regulatory/pdf/arbitration-white-paper. 
pdf [hereinafter White Paper on Arbitration].  An interesting issue to consider, which is 
beyond the scope of this Article, is whether mandatory arbitration is an appropriate 
scheme for the adjudication of disputes between a customer and broker. 
 44. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 
(1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
 45. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2008); Rule 
10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008). 
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fairness and equity.46  Although the vast majority of courts hold that 
there is no private right of action for violations of SRO rules,47 certain 
rules, such as the FINRA suitability rules, set forth the standard of care 
to which registered representatives and broker-dealers are judged in 
arbitration.48  A violation of FINRA rules may arise from intent, reck-
lessness, or negligence.49  To recover in arbitration, a customer asserting 
a claim must prove, at a minimum, that the SRO rule (e.g., suitability) 
sets forth the standard of care and that there was a breach of that stand-
ard of care that proximately caused damages. 
This short Article explores the unsuitability claim from its inception 
to its modern application.  It then discusses unsuitability claims in the 
context of MBSs and CMOs and in the forum of arbitration.  Finally, 
this Article briefly highlights some of the basic considerations of wheth-
er a safe harbor for recommendations of brokers to certain institutional 
customers would be appropriate to consider. 
 46. See White Paper on Arbitration, supra note 43.  There are some instances 
where an action in court based on fraud and a claim in arbitration based on fairness and 
equity will reach the same result, although the starting positions may be different. 
 47. See, e.g., Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 903 F.2d 186, 200 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (“NASD regulations do not give rise to a private right of action.”); Salzmann 
v. Prudential Securities Inc., No. 91 Civ. 4253 (KTD), 1994 WL 191855, at *8 
(S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1994) (agreeing with “the large body of case law holding that no 
private cause of action exists for violation of the rules of self-regulatory organizations” 
(quoting Bloch v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 707 F. Supp. 189, 195-96 (W.D. Pa.1989)). 
 48. See NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC. DEALERS, NASD MANUAL, RULES OF THE 
ASSOCIATION, Rule 2310, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_viewall.html? 
rbid=2403&element_id=3638&record_id=4315 (last visited Oct. 12, 2008) [hereinafter 
FINRA Conduct Rule 2310].  As of the date of publication of this Article, FINRA has 
been in the process of transferring rules from the NASD rulebook to the Consolidated 
FINRA Rulebook.  See FINRA’s Rulebook Consolidation Process, available at 
http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/FINRARules/P038095.  Although technically 
it currently is “NASD” Conduct Rule 2310, this Article refers to all of the rules as 
“FINRA” in anticipation of the transfer to the Consolidated FINRA Rulebook.  It also 
should be noted that some of the rules may be re-numbered following the transfer.  See 
Rulebook Consolidation Process, available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry 
/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p117155.pdf. 
 49. Id. 
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II.  EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF UNSUITABILITY CLAIMS 
A.  The Requirement To Recommend Only Suitable Investments 
The notion that financial services professionals are required to rec-
ommend only suitable investments to customers has existed since the be-
ginning of the securities laws in the United States.50  Shortly after its 
establishment in 1938, the NASD, the SRO then responsible for the 
regulation of the broker-dealers, adopted Article III, section 2 of its 
Rules of Fair Practice,51 which mandated that members recommend only 
suitable investments.52  The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),53 the 
American Stock Exchange,54 and several regional exchanges followed 
with their own rules pertaining to the suitability of investments. 
Beginning in July 2007, the NASD was phased out with the 
creation of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).55  
 
 50. See generally JOHN RAYMOND BOATRIGHT, ETHICS IN FINANCE 15-17 (1999); 
Financial Product Fundamentals, § 10:2.2, at 10-6 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 1999) 
(explaining how an adviser recommended speculative equipment leasing partnerships to 
unsophisticated investors with modest incomes (citing Westmark Fin. Servs. Corp., 
Investment Advisors Act Rel. No. 1117 (May 16, 1998))). 
 51. This rule since has been renamed Conduct Rule 2310.  See Self-Regulatory 
Organizations: Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by National Association of 
Securities Dealers, Inc. Regarding Rearranging of Rules and a New Rule Numbering 
System for The NASD Manual, File No. SR-NASD-95-51, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-36698 (Jan. 11, 1996). 
 52. The rule sets out principles for fair dealing with customers and the broad para-
meters for suitability of securities transactions: 
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a 
member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is 
suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such 
customer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.   
FINRA Conduct Rule 2310(a), supra note 48. 
 53. NYSE Rule 405, first enacted in 1969, currently states as follows: “use due 
diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every customer and every cash or margin 
account, including accounts in Non-Managed Fee-Based Account programs, accepted 
or carried by such member organization.” NYSE Rule 405(6), N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) P 
2405, at 3696 (2001) available at http://rules.nyse.com/nysetools/Exchangeviewer.asp 
?SelectedNode=chp_1_3&manual =/nyse/nyse_rules/nyse-rules/. 
 54. American Stock Exchange Guide (CCH) P 9431, 2647 (1995). 
 55. FINRA was created in July 2007 through the consolidation of NASD and the 
member regulation, enforcement and arbitration functions of the NYSE.  FINRA “is the 
largest non-governmental regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United 
States.”  FINRA.org, About FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/CorporateInfor 
mation/index.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2009). 
260 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &  Vol. XIV 
 FINANCIAL LAW 
 
Although the NASD suitability rule had undergone several amendments 
over the years, the rule currently exists as FINRA Conduct Rule 2310.56  
Because FINRA “oversees nearly 5,000 brokerage firms, about 173,000 
branch offices and approximately 677,000 registered securities repre-
sentatives,”57 FINRA Conduct Rule 2310 is the most often-cited rule in 
disputes concerning suitability.  Rule 2310 does not require a showing of 
intent, or even recklessness, on the part of the financial services repre-
sentative.  Instead, the rule relies upon quasi-equitable principles of due 
care and fair dealing.58  In its current form, FINRA Conduct Rule 2310 
provides: 
(a) In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of 
any security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing 
that the recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis 
of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other 
security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.59 
For non-institutional investors, FINRA members (e.g., brokers) 
must make “reasonable efforts” to obtain information concerning such 
areas as the customer’s financial status, tax status, investment objectives, 
and any other information considered in making a recommendation.60 
By its terms, FINRA Conduct Rule 2310 is limited to recommenda-
tions.61  While the meaning of the term “recommendation” has been the 
subject of much debate, it generally means “when the [FINRA] member 
or its associated person brings a specific security to the attention of the 
customer through any means, including, but not limited to, direct tele-
phone communication, the delivery of promotional material through the 
mail, or the transmission of electronic messages.”62  On the other hand, 
 56. See FINRA Conduct Rule 2310(a), supra note 48. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See, e.g., Nelson v. Pac. Life Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. CV203-131, 2004 WL 
1592617, at *3 (S.D. Ga. July 12, 2004) (“Implicit in all member and registered repre-
sentative relationships with customers and others is the fundamental responsibility for 
fair dealing.” (quoting FINRA Conduct Rule 2310) (internal quotations omitted)). 
 59. FINRA Conduct Rule 2310(a), supra note 48. 
 60. FINRA Conduct Rule 2310(b), supra note 48. 
 61. FINRA Rule 2310(a), supra note 48; see also Parsons v. Hornblower & Weeks-
Hemphill Noyes, 447 F. Supp. 482, 495 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (explaining that Rule 2310(a) 
requires an evaluation of suitability only with respect to recommendations); George A. 
Schieren et al., Suitability and Institutions, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1995, at 699, 752-
61 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7112 1995). 
 62. NASD, Notice to Members 96-60, Clarification of Members’ Suitability 
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FINRA Conduct Rule 2310 “would not apply . . . to situations in which 
a member acts solely as an order-taker for persons who, on their own 
initiative, effect transactions without a recommendation from the 
member.”63  Still, as far back as 1997, the NASD clarified:  “[w]hether a 
particular transaction is in fact recommended depends on an analysis of 
all the relevant facts and circumstances . . . .”64 
Lawyers, academics, and commentators have struggled to deter-
mine when the delivery of promotional materials would constitute a 
“recommendation”.  Today, this debate is particularly important in the 
context of complex financial products such as MBSs and CMOs because 
clients periodically receive reports on these products from brokers.  A 
suitability claim may turn on whether a client received an unsolicited 
report from a broker concerning the product or whether the client re-
quested the material. 
Several provisions of “Interpretative Material” by FINRA help to 
define the scope of the suitability rule.  Interpretative Material is gener-
ally considered to be part of the rules it interprets and has the same im-
portance as the actual rules.65 Three provisions of Interpretative Material 
Responsibilities Under NASD Rules With Special Emphasis On Member Activities In 
Speculative And Low-Priced Securities (Sep. 1996), available at http://www.finra.org/ 
web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p016905.pdf. 
 63. Id. (citing Sales Practice Requirements for Certain Low Priced Securities, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-27160, 54 Fed. Reg. 35468 (Aug. 28, 1989)).  In Release 
No. 34-27160, the SEC explained the term “recommendation” in the context of the new 
penny stock rules.  The Commission explained:  “[T]he NASD and other suitability 
rules have long applied only to “recommended” transactions. . . . [T]he [Penny Stock 
Suitability] Rule would not apply to situations in which a broker-dealer functioned 
solely as an order taker and executed transactions for person who on their own initiative 
decided to purchase a [penny stock] without a recommendation from the broker-dealer.  
Nor would the Rule apply to general advertisements not involving a direct recom-
mendation to the individual.  The Rule would apply, however, to situations where the 
broker-dealer recommends to an investor the purchase of a specific [penny stock], 
whether through direct telephone communication with the customer or through sending 
promotional material through the mail.”  Sales Practice Requirements for Certain Low-
Priced Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 34-27160, 54 Fed. Reg. 35468, 35476-77 
(Aug. 28, 1989), 1989 SEC LEXIS 1603, at 52 (Aug. 22, 1989). 
 64. NASD, For Your Information, Clarification of Notice to Members 96-90 (Mar. 
1997), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/Industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/docu 
ments/Notices/P004933.pdf. 
 65. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(27) (2006).  But see NASD, Notice to Members 96-
25, SEC Approves NASD Manual Revisions, Publication Scheduled for May, NTM 96-
25 (Apr. 1996), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/ 
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are particularly relevant to the suitability doctrine in general, and speci-
fically as applied to complex financial products: (i) IM-2310-1, “Pos-
sible Application of SEC Rules 15g-1 through 15g-9”;66 (ii) IM-2310-2, 
“Fair Dealing with Customers”;67 and (iii) IM-2310-3, “Suitability 
Obligations to Institutional Customers.”68 
IM-2310-1 provides that non-exchange-listed equity trading for less 
than $5 per share may be subject to the SEC’s penny-stock rules 15g-1 
through 15g-9.69  In essence, these SEC penny-stock rules provide for 
enhanced disclosures and a two-day “cooling off period” during which 
the broker must furnish the investor with a disclosure document that 
must be signed and returned by the investor.70 
IM-2310-2 interjects the equitable concept of “fair dealing” into the 
suitability doctrine.  It states that “sales efforts must be judged on the 
basis of whether they can be reasonably said to represent fair treatment 
for the persons to whom the sales efforts are directed, rather than on the 
argument that they result in profits to customers”.71  IM-2310-2 sets 
forth a non-exhaustive list of examples where fair dealing was not ob-
served.72 It also contains a provision addressing “new financial pro-
ducts,” which may have a bearing on certain MBSs and CMOs.  That 
subsection states in part: 
@notice/documents/notices/p005008.pdf (“IM stands for Interpretive Material of the 
Rules of the Associate that has not been converted to Rule form, including inter-
pretations, resolutions, explanations, policies and guidelines.  The IM number includes 
the number of the Rule or Rules Series which the material interprets.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 66. NASD, Possible Application of SEC Rules 15g-1 through 15g-9, NASD 
Manual (CCH), IM-2310-1, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display 
.html?rbid=2403&record_id=4316&element_id=3639&highlight=Possible+Application
+of+SEC+Rules+15g-1#r4316 [hereinafter IM-2310-1]. 
 67. NASD, Rules of Fair Practice, NASD Manual (CCH), IM-2310-2, available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=4317&eleme
nt_id=3640&highlight=IM-2310-2#r4317 [hereinafter IM-2310-2]. 
 68. NASD, Considerations Regarding the Scope of Members’ Obligations to 
Institutional Customers, NASD Manual (CCH), IM-2310-3, available at http://finra. 
complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3641 
[hereinafter IM-2310-3].  As of the date of publication of this Article, FINRA has been 
in the process of renumbering these provisions.  See supra note 48. 
 69. IM-2310-1, supra note 66. 
 70. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15g-1-9 (2008). 
 71. IM-2310-2, supra note 67. 
 72. Id. 
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As new products are introduced from time to time, it is important 
that members make every effort to familiarize themselves with each 
customer’s financial situation, trading experience, and ability to meet 
the risks involved with such products and to make every effort to 
make customers aware of the pertinent information regarding the 
products.73 
B.  Suitability Obligations Owed to Institutional Investors 
A separate provision of Interpretive Material, IM-2310-3, explains 
the suitability obligations owed to “institutional investors”, particularly 
those “with at least $10 million invested in securities in the aggregate in 
its portfolio and/or under management”.74  It addresses both debt and 
equity securities.75  Although IM-2310-3, by its title, is directed towards 
institutional clients, it reiterates the general, two-part test for suitability.  
That is, the broker must have (1) a reasonable basis for recommending a 
particular security or strategy to an institutional client, and (2) reason-
able grounds for believing the recommendation is suitable for the cus-
tomer to whom it is made.76  In other words, a recommendation must be 
suitable for at least some institutional customer (an objective test) and 
suitable for the specific customer (a subjective test).  IM-2310-3 con-
cedes that “[t]he manner in which a member fulfills this suitability obli-
gation will vary depending on the nature of the customer and the specific 
transaction,”77 and it provides a non-exhaustive list of the factors that 
should be considered by the broker in making a recommendation.  
Regarding this list, the provision states that: 
 
 73. See id. at (e).  FINRA reiterated these requirements in September 2007 in 
Regulatory Notice 07-43, which stated: “Firms do not have an obligation to shield their 
customers from risks that customers want to take, but they are required to fully 
understand the products recommended by their registered representatives, to give their 
customers a fair and balanced picture of the risks, costs and benefits associated with the 
products or transactions they recommend and recommend only those products that are 
suitable in light of the customer’s financial goals and needs.”  FINRA, Regulatory 
Notice, Senior Investors 07-43 (Sept. 2007), at 3, available at http://www.finra.org/web 
/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p036816.pdf. 
 74. IM-2310-3, supra note 68.  Institutional investors may include corporations, 
trusts, investment banks, municipalities, pension funds, hedge funds, mutual funds, and 
other registered entities.  See FINRA Rule 3110(c). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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[t]he two most important considerations in determining the scope of 
a member’s suitability obligations in making recommendations to an 
institutional customer are the customer’s capability to evaluate in-
vestment risk independently and the extent to which the customer is 
exercising independent judgment in evaluating a member’s recom-
mendation.78 
IM-2310-3 also attempts to explain the point at which the broker-
dealer has satisfied its obligation with respect to suitability for a sophis-
ticated institutional investor.  “Where the broker-dealer has reasonable 
grounds for concluding that the institutional customer is making inde-
pendent investment decisions and is capable of independently evaluating 
investment risk, then a member’s obligation to determine that a recom-
mendation is suitable for a particular customer is fulfilled.”79  A footnote 
following that statement warns, however:  “This interpretation does not 
address the obligation related to suitability that requires that a member 
have ‘. . . a reasonable basis to believe that the recommendation could be 
suitable for at least some customers’”.80 
It is unclear whether this footnote has any independent significance.  
A broker that has reasonable grounds for concluding that the institu-
tional customer has the requisite capability to evaluate the risks arguably 
would meet the duty of having a reasonable basis for believing that the 
investment is suitable for at least one customer.  In other words, the fact 
that an institutional investor with the requisite capability to evaluate the 
risk is purchasing the investment provides a reasonable basis for the 
broker to believe that the investment could be suitable for at least some 
customers. 
C. Special Considerations of Suitability Regarding MBSs and CMOs 
With the rise in mortgage-backed securities at the turn of the 
twenty-first century, the NASD in November 2003 adopted IM-2210-8, 
“Communications with the Public about Collateralized Mortgage 
Obligations (CMOs)”.81  IM-2210-8 sets forth the types of disclosures 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. n.2. 
 81. NASD, Communications with the Public About Collateralized Mortgage 
Obligations (CMOs), NASD Manual (CCH) IM-2210-8, available at http://finra.compli 
net.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=4301&element_id=3625&highl
ight=im-2210-8#r4301 [hereinafter IM-2210-8]. 
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that must be provided to investors.  The level of disclosures required 
differs depending on whether the customer is an institutional investor or 
non-institutional investor.  All advertisements, sales literature, and cor-
respondence provided to any investor concerning CMOs must include, 
among other disclosures, that the instrument is a “Collateralized 
Mortgage Obligation”82 and that “a CMO’s yield and average life will 
fluctuate depending on the actual rate at which mortgage holders prepay 
the mortgages underlying the CMO and changes in current interest 
rates”.83  Comparisons with other investment vehicles, including a bank 
certificate of deposit, are permitted but not required.84  IM 2310-8 also 
requires a broker to provide customers with “questions an investor 
should ask before investing”, but it does not provide any guidance on 
what those questions should be.85 
For non-institutional investors, a broker must offer educational 
materials that include: 
[C]haracteristics and risks of CMOs including credit quality, 
prepayment rates and average lives, interest rates (including their 
effect on value and prepayment rates), tax considerations, minimum 
investments, transaction costs and liquidity;86 
[T]he structure of a CMO, including the various types of tranches 
that may be issued and the rights and risks pertaining to each (in-
cluding the fact that two CMOs with the same underlying collateral 
may be prepaid at different rates and may have different price 
volatility); and87 
[T]he relationship between mortgage loans and mortgage securi-
ties.88 
D. Suitability Claims in the Courts 
Unlike the suitability doctrine that has developed under the rules of 
the NASD and later FINRA, the suitability doctrine under the case law 
is based on rigid legal principals relating to fraud rather than equity and 
 
 82. Id. § (b)(1)(A). 
 83. Id. § (b)(1)(D). 
 84. Id. §  (b)(1)(B). 
 85. Id. § (b)(2)(B). 
 86. Id. § (b)(2)(A)(i). 
 87. Id. § (b)(2)(A)(ii). 
 88. Id. § (b)(2)(A)(iii). 
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stified.92 
 
fairness.  Specifically, the suitability doctrine in case law is rooted pri-
marily in the antifraud provisions of Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.89  The basic elements of an unsuitability 
claim are: 
 
1. that the securities purchased were unsuited to the buyer’s 
needs; 
2. that the defendant knew or reasonably believed the securities 
were unsuited to the buyer’s needs; 
3. that the defendant recommended or purchased the unsuitable 
securities for the buyer anyway; 
4. that, with scienter, the defendant made material misrepresenta-
tions (or, owing a duty to the buyer, failed to disclose material 
information) relating to the suitability of the securities; and 
5. that the buyer justifiably relied to its detriment on the defen-
dant’s fraudulent conduct.90 
 
Unlike an unsuitability claim brought under the rules of FINRA, an 
unsuitability claim under Section 10(b) requires the plaintiff-investor to 
establish that there was a material misstatement or omission by the bro-
ker and that the plaintiff-investor relied upon that statement or omis-
sion.91  The level of an investor’s sophistication is the primary factor 
that courts weigh to determine whether the investor’s reliance on 
representations by a broker was ju
 89. Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(explaining that a claim for unsuitability “is a subset of the ordinary §10(b) fraud 
claim”); see also O’Connor v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 965 F.2d 893, 897 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(The court explained that a suitability claim could be analyzed “simply as a misrepre-
sentation or failure to disclose a material fact.  In such a case, the broker has omitted 
telling the investor the recommendation is unsuitable for the investor’s interests. The 
court may then use traditional laws concerning omission to examine the claim.”). 
 90. Brown, 991 F.2d at 1031 (setting forth the elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim 
based on unsuitability). 
 91. Robert N. Clemens Trust v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., 485 F.3d 840, 846 (6th 
Cir. 2007) (“A valid claim under Section 10(b) of the Act and Rule 10b-5 ‘must allege, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, the misstatement or omission of a 
material fact, made with scienter, upon which the plaintiff justifiably relied and which 
proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.’”) (quoting In re Comshare Inc., 183 F.3d 
542, 548 (6th Cir. 1999)). 
 92. See, e.g., Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 642 F. Supp. 1277, 1299 (W.D. Mich. 
1986) (holding that the sophistication of the customer is dispositive). 
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Historically, courts have been reluctant to hold that sophisticated 
investors relied on recommendations made by their brokers.93  For 
example, in Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., the Fourth 
Circuit held that a brokerage firm, Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., did not 
fraudulently sell unsuitable investments when it sold CMOs to Banca 
Cremi, S.A., a Mexican bank, because Banca Cremi was a sophisticated 
investor with knowledge of the risks.94  When the market in CMOs 
collapsed in 1994, Banca Cremi suffered substantial losses on six CMOs 
it had purchased through Alex. Brown.  The Fourth Circuit found that 
Banca Cremi had chosen its own investment strategy by balancing the 
risks and benefits of the CMOs against its goals.95  The court concluded 
that Banca Cremi had sufficient sophistication and had been provided 
with adequate information to appreciate the risks of CMOs “to render 
unjustified any reliance on a recommendation that the securities were 
suitable investments”.96 
 
 93. See, e.g., Banca Cremi, 132 F.3d 1017; Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., 814 F.2d 
798, 804-06 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that investors, who were wealthy and sophisticated 
attorneys, were not justified in relying on misrepresentation of broker’s employee 
concerning limited partnership units); Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 
673, 677-78 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that an investor, who had a college degree in 
economics, had taken a course in accounting, had read corporate financial reports with 
understanding, and who was a regular reader of investment advisory literature failed to 
assert a claim for unsuitability); Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 763 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(“The securities laws were not enacted to protect sophisticated businessmen from their 
own errors of judgment.  Such investors must, if they wish to recover under federal law, 
investigate the information available to them with the care and prudence expected from 
people blessed with full access to information.”). 
 94. Banca Cremi, 132 F.3d at 1032. 
 95. Id. at 1029. 
 96. Id. at 1032; see also supra note 93. 
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anel explained: 
 
III.  ARBITRATION OF UNSUITABILITY CLAIMS OF MORTGAGE-BACKED 
SECURITIES AND COLLATERALIZED MORTGAGE OBLIGATIONS 
As a result of mandatory arbitration clauses in most customer 
agreements, arbitration tribunals have become the principal forum for 
private actions for damages based on violation of the suitability doctrine.  
Arbitrators have greater flexibility than federal judges in fashioning an 
outcome based on principles of fairness and equity.97  Indeed, The 
Arbitrator’s Manual states: 
Equity is justice in that it goes beyond the written law.  And it is 
equitable to prefer arbitration to the law court, for the arbitrator 
keeps equity in view, whereas the judge looks only to the law, and 
the reason why arbitrators were appointed was that equity might 
prevail.98 
A review of arbitration decisions illustrates the flexible standards 
that arbitrators apply to reach a result.  For example, in Peterzell v. 
Charles Schwab & Co., a retail customer brought a claim against his 
broker for damages, alleging that the broker induced him to purchase op-
tions that were unsuitable for his investment objectives.99  The 
brokerage firm argued that the broker never asserted that he was an 
expert in options trades, that the customer indicated that he was 
experienced in options trades, and that the broker provided the customer 
with an accurate prospectus.100  The arbitration panel nevertheless 
awarded the customer a portion of his claim.101 The p
Claimant, Joel Peterzell, contributed to his losses by providing false 
information, devising a questionable strategy and continuing to trade 
 97. See Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse: Judicial 
Review of Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 120 (1997) (“Unlike judges who 
are bound by rigid legal principles, arbitrators tend to be flexible, considering business 
ethics, the relation of the parties and other nonlegal factors in reaching innovative 
decisions.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 98. Sec. Indust. Conf. On Arbitration, The Arbitrator’s Manual, Preface (2007), 
available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/arbitrationmediation/@arbmed/@neutrl/ 
documents/arbmed/p009668.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2008) (quoting Domke on 
Aristotle). 
 99. Peterzell v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., No. 88-02868, 1991 WL 202358 
(N.A.S.D. June 17, 1991). 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. 
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as losses mounted.  Suitability, however, is an ongoing obligation 
and, although Charles Schwab initially met its suitability obligations, 
it failed to maintain any ongoing supervision of the Claimant’s 
suitability. 
At some point in time, Claimant became unsuitable, even with his 
false representations.  Charles Schwab’s Compliance Department 
should have, at that time, realized his losses were disproportionate to 
his claimed net worth and annual income.102 
In other words, arbitration panels have awarded damages to cus-
tomers even where the same claims may not have survived a motion to 
dismiss in federal court.103  That is because absolute defenses in law are 
generally viewed by arbitrators as merely mitigating factors to weigh in 
determining the overall fairness of the result.104  The statistics seem to 
prove this point:  20% of all arbitration claims are ultimately decided by 
arbitrators, while only about 1.5% of civil claims filed in court are 
decided by a judge or jury.105 
Moreover, judicial review of arbitration awards is severely limited.  
Arbitration decisions are rarely published, so arbitrators can fashion 
equitable remedies without facing public scrutiny.  In addition, under the 
Federal Arbitration Act, a court generally may not vacate an arbitration 
award because the arbitrator made erroneous findings of fact or mis-
applied the law.106  Instead, the appellant must establish, inter alia, that 
the arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law, which is nearly 
impossible to show, particularly when the decision of the arbitration 
panel is not published.107 
 102. Id. 
 103. See White Paper on Arbitration, supra note 43, at 26 (“Whereas motion prac-
tice is standard in courts, SRO arbitration generally discourages dispositive motions.”). 
 104. See id. at 26-28. 
 105. Id. at 3. 
 106. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2008); see also Miller v. Prudential Bach Securities, Inc., 884 
F.2d 128, 130 (4th Cir. 1989) (“[S]uch misinterpretation or misapplication simply does 
not constitute grounds for vacating an arbitrator’s decision.”). 
 107. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Intern. Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 91-92 
(2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the arbitral panel did not manifestly disregard the law; 
“‘The manifest disregard’ doctrine allows a reviewing court to vacate an arbitral award 
only in those exceedingly rare instances where some egregious impropriety on the part 
of the arbitrators is apparent” (quotation omitted)); Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hale, 19 
Misc.3d 975, 985, 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 28141, 9 (N.Y. Sup. Mar 31, 2008) (holding that 
arbitrator’s ruling satisfies the threshold “barely colorable” interpretive standard of 
review for manifest disregard of law to be applied under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)).  But see 
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A. Claims Brought by Retail Customers 
With these concepts in mind, customers who have suffered losses 
from MBSs and CMOs likely will assert unsuitability claims that are 
focused on the general unfairness associated with their losses.  Investors 
who purchased low tranche CMOs (which had the greatest risk) and 
CMO derivatives based on the advice of their brokers have suffered the 
largest losses.  Some have argued that the low tranches and CMO deriv-
atives are per se unsuitable for retail customers given the tremendous 
risk associated.108  This is not the first time such an argument has been 
advanced.  When the CMO market crashed in 1994, commentators ques-
tioned whether low tranche CMOs and CMO derivatives were appro-
priate for retail customers, and successful legal actions were brought 
under the premise that they were not.109  This argument, however, fails 
to account for the fact that some retail investors are sophisticated and 
may have a preference for high-risk investments. 
In the recent subprime mortgage crisis, some initial signs indicate 
that brokers may have pushed retail customers into these risky products.  
In a June 2007 “ComplianceAlert”,110 the Office of Compliance 
Inspections and Examinations (OCIE)111 of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission identified a number of deficiencies in the sales practices at 
some broker-dealers that sold CMOs to retail customers.  OCIE ob-
 
Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the 
arbitrators acted with manifest disregard for the law). 
 108. See Churchill, supra note 15. 
 109. Susan Antilla, Wall Street; Salomon’s Hong Kong Hangover, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
18, 1994, at F13; see also Ted Sickinger, Broker Hit with Big Fine: Piper Jaffray Cited 
for Improper Marketing of High-Risk Derivatives, KAN. CITY STAR, Mar. 7, 1996, at B1 
(describing how NASD disciplined Piper Jaffray for improperly marketing and selling a 
mutual fund that contained high-risk, mortgage-backed derivatives); Merrill Lynch Is 
Told To Pay Two Clients, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1996, at 45 (describing how NASD 
arbitration panel awarded $1 million to elderly sisters after Merrill Lynch sold to them 
CMOs on margin). 
 110. SEC, ComplianceAlert (June 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/ 
offices/ocie/complialert.htm [hereinafter ComplianceAlert]. 
 111. “The Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (“OCIE”) protects 
investors through administering the SEC’s nationwide examination and inspection pro-
gram.  Examiners in Washington D.C. and in the Commission’s 11 regional offices 
conduct examinations of the nation’s registered entities, including self-regulatory 
organizations, broker-dealers, transfer agents, investment companies and investment 
advisers.”  SEC, OCIE http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie.shtml (last visited Nov. 7, 
2008). 
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served that the broker-dealers it had examined “had sold some of the 
most complex and riskiest classes of [CMO] securities to their retail 
customers”.112  If a broker recommended these higher-risk products and 
the retail customer suffered a loss, arbitrators might feel compelled 
under equitable principles to award damages without fully evaluating 
whether the customer appreciated the risks.113  On the flip side, the suita-
bility evaluation creates the potential for gamesmanship as retail invest-
ors might argue in hindsight that they lacked the requisite sophistication 
to appreciate the risks of the investment. 
The disclosures provided by some brokers to investors may have 
been insufficient.  In its 2007 examination, OCIE stated that “[i]n some 
cases, the firms did not provide investors with NASD-required 
educational materials”114, which are required by IM-2210-8.115  “At 
other times, firms presented investors with sales literature that appeared 
to be unbalanced and misleading in the way that it portrayed the risks 
and yields of the securities, and that generally minimized the risks of the 
securities.”116  OCIE also observed that some firms either failed to sub-
mit the advertisements and sales literature concerning CMOs to the 
NASD for approval, or did not “respond adequately to NASD’s com-
ments prior to using sales material.  These firms disseminated informa-
tion which did not appear to provide balanced and complete disclosure 
of the risks inherent in the CMOs that were sold”.117  Undoubtedly, both 
retail and institutional investors that lost money on MBSs and CMOs as 
a result of a broker’s failure to provide proper literature will highlight 
that failure in their arbitration complaints. 
Further compounding customer harm, some brokers recommended 
 112. ComplianceAlert, supra note 110. 
 113. See Michael Hudson & Justin Lahart, Suits Fly over Mortgage Risks to 
Investors, CHI. TRIB., Jul. 22, 2007, at 41.   Awarding recovery to a retail customer, who 
knowingly assumed the risks of the investment, potentially creates a moral hazard.  If 
recovery is possible under the suitability doctrine irrespective of the investor’s sophisti-
cation, then the investor would have less incentive to undertake his own independent 
analysis of the risks. 
 114. ComplianceAlert, supra note 110. 
 115. See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text. 
 116. ComplianceAlert, supra note 110. 
 117. See id.  In September 2008, FINRA brought an enforcement action against 
three brokers who engaged in abuses in their marketing and sales of mortgage-backed 
securities to retail customers.  See FINRA Sanctions Three Brokers for Sales of CMOs 
to Retail Investors, available at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2008 
/P039153 (last visited Feb. 1, 2009). 
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that retail customers invest in MBSs and CMOs on margin.118  Investing 
on margin is essentially borrowing money from a broker to purchase 
securities.119  A broker’s recommendation to purchase on margin may be 
considered unsuitable, even aside from the underlying investment, if the 
customer, such as an elderly or retired customer, cannot absorb losses or 
has a low risk tolerance.120  Some securities are simply not appropriate 
for margin accounts due to the risks involved.  For instance, brokers 
generally do not permit customers to purchase penny stocks, over-the-
counter bulletin board securities or initial public offerings on margin.121  
Given the risks associated with certain MBSs and CMOs (particularly 
CMO derivatives), allowing certain customers to purchase these instru-
ments on margin may be viewed as presumptive evidence of unsuita-
bility. 
B. Claims Bought by Institutional Investors 
For institutional investors, the outcome of an unsuitability claim in 
arbitration may turn, as a practical matter, less on fairness and more on 
whether the institutional investor was able to appreciate and comprehend 
the risks.122  Of course, if the broker provided false or misleading dis-
closures to an institutional customer, then the arbitrator may not reach 
the question of the customer’s sophistication except to ascertain whether 
the customer knew the information was false or misleading.123  If, on the 
 
 118. See, e.g., Sonn & Erez, More About Misconduct, http://www.sonnerez.com/ 
PracticeAreas/More-About-Misconduct.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2008). 
 119.  Investopedia.com, Margin Trading: What Is Buying on Margin?, 
http://www.investopedia.com/university/margin/margin1.asp (last visited Nov. 7, 2008). 
 120. See Merrill Lynch Is Told To Pay Two Clients, supra note 109 (describing how 
NASD arbitration panel awarded $1 million to two elderly sisters after Merrill Lynch 
sold them CMOs on margin). 
 121. Margin Trading:  What Is Buying on Margin?, supra note 119. 
 122. See, e.g., Banca Cremi, 132 F.3d at 1029 (rejecting plaintiff bank’s argument 
that it was not a sophisticated investor based on records reflecting that it did not blindly 
follow broker’s advice); Kennedy 814 F.2d at 804-06 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that 
investors, who were wealthy and sophisticated attorneys, were not justified in relying 
on misrepresentation of broker’s employee concerning limited partnership units); 
Follansbee, 681 F.2d at 677-78 (holding that an investor, who had a college degree in 
economics, who had taken a course in accounting, who had read corporate financial 
reports with understanding, and who was a regular reader of investment advisory 
literature failed to assert a claim for unsuitability); Hirsh, 553 F.2d 3 at 763. 
 123. Cf. Banca Cremi, 132 F.3d at 1029 (holding that bank’s reliance on broker’s 
false misrepresentation was not justified because knowledge can be imputed when 
investor’s conduct amounts to recklessness). 
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other hand, the broker provided complete and accurate disclosures to the 
institutional customer as required under IM-2210-8, the outcome of the 
arbitration likely will depend on the level of sophistication of the institu-
tional customer.124  The arbitration proceeding therefore will focus on 
the level of review conducted by the institutional customer, as well as 
the sophistication of the persons at the institution who conducted the 
review. 
Certain MBSs and CMOs may be so complex that some insti-
tutional investors cannot appreciate the risk.  FINRA explained this con-
cern in a Regulatory Notice in September 2007: 
FINRA is concerned about the suitability of recommendations to 
some pension plans, particularly recommendations involving rela-
tively new, complicated or high-risk asset classes such as . . . the 
equity tranches of some collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs).  
As NASD IM-2310-3 points out, even institutional investors that 
have the general capability to assess risk may not be able to under-
stand a particular instrument, particularly a product that is new or 
that has significantly different risk and volatility characteristics than 
other investments made by the institution.  Therefore, in making 
recommendations to institutional customers, including pension 
funds, firms should consider both the general ability of the institution 
to independently assess investment risk, and whether the customer 
understands the particular product well enough to exercise that 
ability with respect to the recommendation.125 
The difficulty lies in the fact that all institutional investors are not 
equivalent.  FINRA defines “institutional customer” in general terms as 
“any entity other than a natural person”.126  Some institutional investors 
– such as commercial banks, large municipalities, and public companies 
– usually employ persons with financial expertise to oversee the invest-
ments of the institution.  The size of the institution generally affects its 
financial ability to hire investment officers with the requisite knowledge 
and skills to understand complex financial products.127 
Even with the expertise of investment officers, however, some 
institutional investors have lost substantial amounts of money as a result 
 124. Cf. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1279 (S.D. 
Ohio 1996). 
 125. FINRA, Regulatory Notice, Senior Investors, supra note 73, at 4. 
 126. IM-2310-3, supra note 68. 
 127. See Norman S. Poser, Liability of Broker-Dealers for Unsuitable 
Recommendations to Institutional Investors, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1493, 1505 (2001). 
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of brokers recommending unsuitable investments.128  For example, in 
the 1990s, the large conglomerate Proctor & Gamble brought an unsuita-
bility claim after suffering substantial losses on unsuitable investments 
recommended by its broker.129  Similarly, one academic institution in the 
mid-1990s, City Colleges of Chicago, lost $50 million, which comprised 
half of its portfolio, as a result of its investments in CMOs.130  Orange 
County, California, with $7.4 billion in assets, has been one of the 
largest institutions to bring an unsuitability claim against a broker.131 
Obviously, an institutional investor, which is not a natural person, 
cannot be “sophisticated” or “unsophisticated”; rather, the level of the 
institution’s sophistication depends entirely on the individual or individ-
uals tasked with evaluating the investment decision.  Even some institu-
tional investors benefit from the added input of a broker.  As one muni-
cipal official testified in the aftermath of the 1994 CMO crash: 
Regardless of the size of their portfolio or their level of 
sophistication, state and local government investors are unlikely to 
have access to either the quantity or quality of information relating to 
specific investment instruments that a broker-dealer has.  Broker 
dealers have real-time, virtually unlimited access to information, 
such as pricing, structure, and risk factors of an instrument.132 
Another focus in any arbitration involving an institutional customer 
will be on the stated investment objectives of the institution, which may 
 128. See, e.g., State v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 459 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1995) 
(unsuitability claims on behalf of the state of West Virginia); City of San Jose v. Paine, 
Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., No. C 84-20601 RFP, 1991 WL 352485 (N.D. Cal. 
June 6, 1991) (unsuitability claim on behalf of City of San Jose, California); Pension 
Fund-Mid Jersey Trucking Indus.–Local 701 v. Omni Funding Group, 731 F. Supp. 161 
(D.N.J. 1990) (unsuitability claim on behalf of pension fund); MidAmerica Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 886 F.2d 1249 (10th Cir. 1989) 
(unsuitability claim on behalf of savings and loan institution); Associated Randall Bank 
v. Griffin, Kubik, Stephens & Thompson, Inc., 3 F.3d 208 (7th Cir. 1993) (unsuitability 
claim on behalf of a bank). 
 129. Proctor & Gamble, 925 F. Supp. 1270. 
 130. Westcap Enters. v. City Colleges of Chicago, 230 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 131. County of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re County of Orange), 191 B.R. 
1005, 1017 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996); Andrew Pollack & Leslie Wayne, Ending Suit, 
Merrill Lynch to Pay California County $400 million, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1998, at 
A1. 
 132. Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the 
H. Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Mark J. Saladino, Principal 
Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles County, California). 
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be reflected in the municipality’s governing law or in the institution’s 
articles of organization, charter, or bylaws.  If a broker recommended an 
investment that conflicts with the stated investment objectives of the 
institution, then the institution may be able to recover on an unsuitability 
claim even where the institution’s investment officers fully compre-
hended the risks.133 
IV.  CONSIDERATION OF A NEW APPROACH FOR INSTITUTIONAL AND 
SOPHISTICATED INVESTORS 
 
The anticipated influx of unsuitability claims relating to MBSs and 
CDOs may spark calls for new regulatory guidance in the area of insti-
tutional investors.  Such guidance may be long overdue.  The number of 
institutional investors and their influence has increased significantly in 
the second half of the last century.  In 1950, only seven percent of the 
total outstanding corporate stock was owned by institutional investors.134  
By 2000, fifty-one percent of all stock was owned by institutional 
investors.135 
Any regulatory response should consider the potential moral hazard 
created by the existing suitability rules for institutional customers.  By 
having the recourse of an unsuitability claim, institutional investors are 
insulated from some investment risk, which may result in that investor 
undertaking less due diligence than if it had borne more risk.  As dis-
cussed above, IM-2310-3 attempts to address this concern regarding the 
moral hazard with respect to sophisticated institutional investors by 
stating that a broker’s obligations are discharged after determining that 
the institutional customer has made an “independent investment 
decision[]” and is “capable of independently evaluating investment 
risk.”136 
Unfortunately, IM-2310-3 provides little certainty to investors or 
broker-dealers.  The scheme under IM-2310-3 is open to manipulation 
by some investors who might claim post hoc in arbitration that they 
lacked the ability to appreciate the risk at the time of their investment 
decision.  On the other hand, the scheme also allows for brokers to argue 
that their institutional customers appreciated the risk and made an inde-
 133. FINRA, Regulatory Notice, Senior Investors, supra note 73, at 4. 
 134. Poser, supra note 127, at 1501. 
 135. Id. 
 136. IM-2310-3, supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. 
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pendent investment decision.  Coupled with the uncertainty associated 
with IM-2310-3 is the inherent uncertainty of arbitration proceedings 
that rely on principles of fairness and equity and turn on whether a 
broker made a “recommendation”.  All of these uncertainties presum-
ably are priced into the transactions between a broker and an institu-
tional customer, resulting in higher transaction costs. 
In order to address the potential moral hazard and the uncertainties 
under the current scheme, one proposal that might be considered is the 
implementation of a safe harbor for brokers that provide recommenda-
tions to certain institutional investors and sophisticated individuals.137  
Under this proposal, if the broker has not provided any materially false 
or misleading information or omitted material information, then that 
broker’s recommendation of a financial product – coupled with com-
plete and truthful disclosure of all the risks – to an institutional or 
sophisticated customer should not be subjected to subsequent scrutiny in 
arbitration.  Indeed, in some situations, an institutional investor and 
sophisticated individual may understand the financial product as well, if 
not better than, the broker making the recommendation.138 
A safe harbor for broker recommendations to institutional investors 
and sophisticated individual investors would be analogous in some 
respects to the private offering exemptions under the Securities Act of 
1933.139  An institutional investor and high net-worth individual (ex-
ceeding a certain income or asset threshold) could be precluded from 
bringing an unsuitability claim based on a recommendation of an in-
vestment, provided the broker did not make any material misstatements 
or omit material facts concerning the investment.  An additional require-
ment based on the number of years of investment experience could be 
added to the safe harbor for individual investors in order to address con-
cerns that income and net worth do not necessarily correlate with invest-
ment sophistication. 
Moreover, to meet the safe harbor, brokers could be required to 
provide a uniform disclosure document with detailed warnings that, in 
 137. The author takes no position on whether such proposal ultimately should be 
adopted.  Rather, this proposal should be carefully evaluated and studied, along with 
other potential alternatives. 
 138. See, e.g., Banca Cremi, 132 F.3d at 1029 (rejecting plaintiff-bank’s argument 
that it is not a sophisticated investor). 
 139. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501, et seq.; see also SEC, Accredited Investors, http://www. 
sec.gov/answers/accred.htm; SEC, Rule 506 of Regulation D, http://www.sec.gov/ 
answers/rule506.htm. 
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effect, instruct the investors on the safe harbor and strongly encourage 
the investor to seek independent counsel and advice.  Finally, the safe 
harbor for institutional customers could be limited to recommendations 
to a subset of institutional investors that are particularly well-equipped 
to assess the risk of their investment such as large financial institutions 
and corporations.  The safe harbor would not apply to a broker’s recom-
mendations to institutional investors that have specific legal constraints 
regarding their types of investments. 
There are potential benefits of a safe harbor that should be evalu-
ated.  First, a safe harbor likely would decrease the number of claims 
brought in litigation and arbitration by customers that presumably can 
fend for themselves regarding their investment decisions.  Second, a safe 
harbor might encourage institutional investors to hire personnel with the 
requisite skills and expertise to evaluate complex investment products.  
In effect, it would incentivize institutional investors to conduct thorough 
due diligence to “self-police” their own investment decisions.140  
Conversely, it would create a disincentive for institutional investors to 
invest in high-risk instruments that could result in significant losses.  
Third, by creating an incentive to self-police, a safe harbor likely would 
reduce reliance on third-party ratings.  Some commentators have pointed 
to third-party ratings as a culprit in the current subprime crisis, arguing 
that MBSs and CDOs are so complex that investors relied blindly on 
credit ratings.141  By placing greater emphasis on firm due diligence, the 
safe harbor may have a secondary effect of reducing reliance on third-
party ratings. 
A safe harbor does not come without costs.  Some commentators 
have criticized similar safe-harbor approaches tied to investor wealth or 
sophistication as creating an unfair shift in responsibility.142  They argue 
that sophisticated investors deserve protection under the federal securi-
ties laws from intentionally or recklessly fraudulent conduct by a broker.  
As the Second Circuit explained forty years ago, “a salesman cannot 
deliberately ignore that which he has a duty to know and recklessly state 
 140. Self-policing is not a substitute for vigorous enforcement of the securities laws 
by regulators. 
 141. See, e.g., Opening Statement of Chairman Henry A. Waxman, Hearing of the 
Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. H. of Reps. (Oct. 22, 2008), 
available at http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=2255; John Birger, The woman 
who called Wall Street’s meltdown, FORTUNE, Aug. 6, 2008, available at http://money. 
cnn.com/2008/08/04/magazines/fortune/whitney_feature.fortune/index.htm. 
 142. See Poser, supra note 127. 
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facts about matters of which he is ignorant. . . . The fact that his 
customers may be sophisticated and knowledgeable does not warrant a 
less stringent standard”.143 
The concerns of those commentators, however, may be addressed in 
part by fashioning a safe harbor that is limited to recommendations not 
involving material misstatements or omissions.  By limiting the safe 
harbor to merely the recommendations by brokers (and not any misstate-
ments or omissions), the safe harbor might serve to prevent brokers from 
becoming insurers for the choices of their institutional customers, 
thereby reducing the moral hazard observed under the current system.  
The anticipated result would be that institutional clients would make 
more careful investment decisions, hopefully avoiding another reoccur-
rence of the types of losses that occurred in the 1994 CMO crash and the 
recent subprime mortgage crisis.144 
A safe harbor for certain institutional customers does not foreclose 
the possibility that institutional customers and broker-dealers will “opt 
in” to an arrangement of added protection.  Presumably, sophisticated 
parties are able to fend for themselves. 
Institutional customers and broker-dealers can agree to contract 
terms that are mutually beneficial and that allocate the risks in a trans-
parent and predictable fashion.  In some instances, institutional custom-
ers may contract for additional protection and incur additional trans-
action costs.  In other instances, institutional customers may contract for 
less protection and incur less cost.  The ultimate level of protection 
would be determined on the front end, which in turn would help guide 
the level of diligence required by the institutional customer. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
As the subprime mortgage crisis continues to unfold, there will be a 
substantial increase in the number of claims brought by customers 
 143. Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969); see also SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (“The speculators and chartists of Wall 
Street and Bay Street are also ‘reasonable’ investors entitled to the same legal 
protections afforded conservative traders.”). 
 144. There are undoubtedly other costs and benefits associated with a safe harbor 
that cannot be contemplated without a thorough study.  Therefore, a full analysis of all 
the costs and benefits would be required before any action is taken.  This Article merely 
presents some of the issues to be debated, and it does not advocate for a particular 
outcome. 
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alleging that brokers recommended unsuitable investments in MBSs and 
CMOs.  As with the 1994 CMO crash, there will be a significant number 
of claims brought by institutional investors.  These claims should 
prompt regulators to reconsider the unsuitability doctrine as applied to 
certain institutional customers.  Creating a safe harbor for the recom-
mendations of broker-dealers to certain institutional investors may en-
courage more careful review of investments by the institutional custom-
ers and may provide greater certainty to both institutional customers and 
broker-dealers. 
 
